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1. Introduction 
According to a common assumption in the traditional theon.• of publi·c fi 1· · I d · · 
• • • • •J mance, po 1t1ca ec1s1on 
makers, when dec1dmg changes m the mtertemporal flow of government re\· d d. 
. . enues an expen 1tures, 
take mto account the long-run budg_et con~tramt of the public sector. The risi: of government failure is 
therefore excluded from the analysis, as 1s the possibility of financing public expenditures through a 
pennanently increasing debt ratio of the public sector. Revenues and expenditures are assumed to be 
equilibrated over the long run. 
This ~ssumption about ~e long-run ~o-ordinati?n between spending and taxes docs not per se say 
anything about the specific nature this mechanism may take in practice. Governments m:iv follow 
ei~er of three logical~y possible ways. First, they can fix expenditures at a given value a~d t()' to 
adJust _revenues _to this l~vel. Second, revenues may be taken as given and expenditures adjusted 
accordingly. Tlurd, a mixture of the above two strategies, might be adopted with revenues and 
expenditures changing their role as target and instrument values over time. 
The question, which of these three adjustment mechanisms prevails in practice, has been met with 
increasing interest in the economic profession over the last years. Various attempts have lx.."Cn 
undertaken to discriminate empirically between them (see e.g. von Furstenberg et.al. 1986, M1/lcr • 
Russek 1990, Bohn 1991). The main reason for this new interest lies in the fact that, in recent years, 
the governments of several leading industrialized countries have made clear sbtemcnts regarding these 
mechanisms. 
In line with (meanwhile) standard supply-side reasoning they argue that an improvement in long-nm 
growth perspectives and in overall economic efficiency can only be brought about by significantly 
reducing government activities, as measured by their share in GDP. Moreover, they claim that: 1 
1) A reduction of the share of government activities in GDP can only be achieved by bx cuts, since 
only hard budget constraints can improve productivity in public sector administrations; any 
attempt to cut spending without previously cutting receipts is doomed to failure. 
2) While tax cuts and deficit reduction are mutually compatible targets, bx increases arc 
inconsistent with a lasting reduction of budget deficits. Higher revenues would quickly stimulate 
additional demands from administrations and thus leave any previous budgcbry imbalance 
unchanged. 
The present coalition government of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Austria seems to 
subscribe also to the views expressed in the above-mentioned propositio~s. This can at least be infc~rcd 
from what official documents (Bundesregierung 1987, 1991) and leadmg government rcprcscnbtlvcs 
(Ditz 1992, Lacina 1992) say. 
In this paper we investigate to which extent the historical development of the public sector in Austria 
can be explained by the above-mentioned propositions. To this effect we analyse the ~~sal 
relationship between taxes and spending by estimating a tri-variate VAR model. Thereby pr?pos1t1ons 
1 and 2 will be confirmed if we can find a causal dependency of expenditures on tax~ and if chang:s 
in deficits can be explained by shocks in revenues, rather than by shocks in expenditures. To put m 
comparative terms, we will consider propositions 1 and 2 the better confirmed, the stronger the causal 
1 See for the USA for instance Government Printing Office 1984, 1985, for the United Kingdom r°~CD 
1981, HMSO 1986, for Germany BM/F 1985, Sachversttindigenrat 1985, were at least parts o csc 
propositions are expressed. 
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dependency of expenditures on taxes and the better changes in deficits can be explained by shocks in 
taxes. 
Section two of this paper develops some arguments in line with standard public choice theory which 
will be useful for the interpretation of our empirical findings. Sections 3 and 4 describe the database 
and present in some detail the methodology used for our empirical analysis respectively. In section 5, 
the empirical results will be presented and their correspondence with propositions l and 2 be examined. 
Section 5 summarizes the main findings an draws some conclusions. 
2. Revenues or Expenditures: Which Side Dominates the Budget ? 
Unfortunately, public choice theory does not unambiguously discriminate between the three logically 
possible mechanisms of equilibrating government revenues with outlays, as described above. On the 
contrary, highly plausible explanations for each of these three possibilities are offered. 
Traditional public finance theory, for instance, interprets the process of political decision making as the 
action of a benevolent dictator. Outlays and revenues are thought to be determined simultaneously, so 
as to maximize long-run social welfare (Musgrave 1985). Simultaneity does not mean that the budget 
must be permanently in balance. Differing time profiles of welfare maximizing expenditure and 
revenue flows (Barro 1979), or unanticipated demand or supply shocks could easily bring government 
budgets in transitory deficits or surpluses. But no exclusive or one-sided causal relationship between 
revenues and expenditures should prevail. Furthermore, we should not expect the development of the 
budget deficit to be exclusively dominated by either revenue shocks or expenditure shocks. The 
relationship is most likely characterized by a high degree of coincidence. 
The second, and without doubt more popular view of the political decision making process is that the 
expenditure side dominates the development of the budget. Implicitly we find this assumption embodied 
in nearly all economic models. This is true for Keynesian-type stabilization models, as well as for 
neoclassical growth models. The emphasis is always put on the effects which discretionary changes in 
outlays have on income, employment, or long-run growth. Far less attention is paid to revenues; they 
are expected to adjust endogenously and/or to be changed ex post so as to guarantee the long run 
budget constraint, even after the development of government spending has been changed discretionary. 
No doubt, this assumption about the relative importance of spending and taxing is not constitutive for 
the respective theory. But it seems to reflect a wide-spread prejudice regarding the mechanism which 
drives the process of political decision making in our society. It was Adam Smith who had expressed 
this view already two centuries ago, when he criticized that the availability of credit facilities to the 
government would often induce a lasting increase of public sector spending above the level that would 
prevail in a world where outlays have to be financed out of current revenues (Smith 1776, V}. 
Imperfect information and too high a rate of time preference would lead to an underestimation of the 
future burden of current deficits and thus cause a suboptimal intertemporal allocation of resources. 
Note the similarity of this argumentation to that of the advocates of modem public choice theory 
(Buchanan - Wagner 1977, Rowley 1987), criticizing the practice of Keynesian stabilization policy. 
They also argue that additional outlays accepted during recessions would commonly not be reduced in 
the ensuing recovery. Budget balance would rather be restored by increasing taxes, leading to a 
permanently growing share of government activities in total GDP. 
A causal relationship between government receipts and outlays as described here need not necessarily 
be interpreted as a consequence of some kind of government failure. It could be seen as well as the 
inevitable result of a higher long run income elasticity of public goods in comparison to private goods 
3 
(Wagners Law). An increase in the share of government activ,·t,·es ..... a f GDP h 
. . = percentage o can t en 
hardly be mterpreted as a m1sallocation of resources. 
Wear~ thus offered e:en tw~ ~iffer_ent explanations, each of them highly plausible, th:it might establish 
a dommance of spendmg dec1s1ons m the course of the budget dec·,s·,on m-'·· I · · 1 . . .using process. n an empmca 
conte~ this makes us expecting that the _results from our time series estim:ites should detect a nearlv 
exclusive dependency of government receipts from government outl:iys. • 
The third logically ~ossible rela~i?n betw~en government outlays and receipts is the one described by 
the two above-mentioned propos1t1ons, which have become increasingly popular during the last decade. 
Traditionally a causal dependency running from revenues to outlays as maintained therein h:is been 
seen as releva~t _only for tho~e s_ubordinate stat~ and local governments, whose borrowing cap:icities 
are narrowly limited by constitution or by effective credit rationing. At the general govemment level it 
was sometimes also explained as the result of the various kinds of revenue appropri:ition. Whenever 
specific tax revenues are earmarked for specific outlay categories, the latter will most Jikclv be 
determined by the former. · 
During the prosperity years of the 1960s, some authors supposed that the progrcssivity of the tax 
system would cause the built-in elasticity of government revenues to exceed the d)namics of 
government outlays permanently (see Heller 1967).Since they assumed also that political decision 
makers were reluctant to run permanent budget surpluses and judged tax cuts to be not too popular, 
they were led to conclude that a restoration of budget balance would generally be brought about by 
increasing spending.2 However, apart from the fact that most countrie's tax systems arc rarely 
progressive (at least when including social security contributions), we have not experienced a tendency 
towards budgetary surpluses during the last two decades (McKee - Visser - Sounders 1986, Gm.rer 
1986). So, even if this explanation might be relevant for some periods of post war history, it can hardly 
be considered a general hypotheses of the dependency of government outlays from revenues. 
The increased international feed-back effects of domestic budget policies offer a more general and, 
indeed a more convincing explanation for the reversed causality between government expenditures and 
taxes. In fact it is a common knowledge in traditional open economy macroeconomics, that 
repercussions from the balance of payments reduce the effects of domestic deficit spending on national 
income and employment. It is perhaps less well kno,,n that this also reduces the political 
attractiveness of debt financed demand management. In addition, international economic relations arc 
not restricted to the exchange of a few tradable goods and services an}more. They comprise all forms 
of financial, physical and human capital. The direction of the resulting flows is, among other criteria, 
highly influenced by comparative tax advantages. National tax autonomy is therefore severely reduced 
(Streissler 1989) so that it becomes increasingly difficult for national authorities to finance current 
deficits out of higher future taxes. 
We are also currently observing that especially large countries sec themseh·es confr?nted with an 
increasing political pressure from the international community to correct ~y maJor budgetary 
imbalances. As other countries might feel themselves adversely e~ected, most likely bccau~c ~f the 
resulting deterioration in world capital market conditions, the~ ,,111 _urgent!~· ask for a re~t~ction of 
budgetary deficits (De Grauwe 1989). The process of international mtegrat1on therefore limits to an 
increasing extent national governments budget autonomy. 
2 . • · r t"ty also to prevail \\ith the built in dynamics It is not clear whether we should expect tlus darectaon ° causa 1 ' · 
of outlays exceeding those of revenues. 
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We are again offered even more than one plausible explanation for a specific dependency between the 
budget aggregates. In this case, however, we expect our empirical findings to detect a causal 
relationship running from receipts to spending flows. Revenue shocks are supposed to dominate the 
dynamics of the public sector deficit. 
So, it turns impossible to discriminate between the three adjustment mechanisms that are logically 
possible by means of pure public choice reasoning. We therefore need a careful empirical examination 
of the causal relationship connecting government spending and taxes for the history of the decision 
making process in Austria. 
3. The Data: Searching for the correct budget concept 
To discriminate between the three cases distinguished above, we examine first of all the causal 
relationship between the development of taxes and of government spending. Since we assume that the 
government meets its intertemporal budget constraint, we also can investigate whether budgetary 
imbalances, which are deemed intolerable in the long run, have been reduced predominantly by 
expenditure restraints and/or by tax increases. 
Impulse response functions of bi-variate V AR models can bee used to analyse such causality relations 
between economic time series. (Bohn 1991). Such a representation is however insufficient since the 
variables in question are highly dependent on the development of aggregate income. Neglecting this 
joint dependency might easily lead to biased results. We therefore estimated a tri-variate VAR model 
using nominal GDP as an additional explanatory variable. This approach allows us to distinguish 
between the direct causality relation between spending and taxes (and vice versa) and the indirect 
causality effects via GDP. 3 
In addition, we interpret the development of the net deficit as an error correction process. Any 
deviation of the development of the net deficit from its long-run constraint is thereby defined as an 
error that the government has to correct by adjusting revenues (increasing taxes) and/or outlays 
(reducing spending). We thus investigate which side of the budget carries the burden of adjustment in 
practice. 
We confine our empirical research to the federal level of the Austrian government. Despite their 
quantitative importance, the budgets of state and local governments are not taken into account.4 One 
might argue that due to the differences in the political decision making process between federal, state 
and local governments, which could, as mentioned above, shed some light upon the different dynamics 
of the respective budget developments, the inclusion of state and local governments might be 
important. On the other hand one can hardly overlook that the legislative power, especially with regard 
to fiscal policies, is nearly exclusively concentrated at the federal level in Austria. The central 
government also plays the role of a lender of last resort, explicitly or implicitly covering imbalances at 
subordinate administrative levels (Lehner 1992). Austria's state and local governments effective 
economic power is thus by far exaggerated judged from its share on general government budget (Bos -
3 Note that the often used Granger causality tests (Miller, Russek 1990), which are based on a predictability 
concept, do not permit such a distinction. 
4 The share of state and local governments in general government outlays and receipts is approximately 30 
%. Its share in general government debt amounts to 20 %. 
s 
Genser - Holzmann 1983).5 We leave a careful distinction of the different adiustm 
. dm. . . I I fi fu ~ ent processes at 
various a 1mstrat1ve eves or ture research. 
Tax r~~enues as defined in traditional ~ublic finance theory account only for approximately 60% of 
Austria s federal g
0
ovemments total receipts. The r~st comes from (social security) contributions, fees 
and charges (15 1/o), proceeds of federal enterprises ( 15%) and a miscellaneous component ( 
revenues from privatization). It is therefore necessary for our purposes to define taxes in a bro:l 
s~nse and identify them with _rota/ government receipts. Because of the substitutability between ;: 
different components of pubhc sector revenues one can not expect a close relation between taxes 
defined in a narrow sense, and total government outlays to prevail in the data. Total outlays have to~ 
covered by total receipts, no matter what source the latter are from.6 
During the last :ew ye~rs, the economic meaning and relevance of traditional administrative budgets 
concepts, especially with respect to the measurement of the size of the budget deficit, has been 
increasingly questioned. Many alternative and improved concepts have been suggested, ranging from 
rather minor adjustments of administrative budget figures, to far-reaching methodological changes, 
associated for instance with the proposal to take as indicator of budget imbalances public sector's 
comprehensive calculated net worth position (Buiter 1983, 1985), or the displacement effects of fiscal 
policy on private saving and investment (Kottlikojf 1984). 
It may very well be that the economic assessment of the public sector's credit worthiness or of the 
overall economic effects of fiscal policy can in fact be improved by using such alternative budget 
indicators. But again it has to be recalled that our interest is in the political mechanisms that determine 
the coordination between government outlays and receipts, not in the overall economic effects of fiscal 
policy measures. Therefore we are primarily interested in a budget concept that dominates the public 
discussion as well as the process of political decision making. Without any doubt, this is the 
administrative budget. We used it therefore as the basis of our computations. 
We are however aware that in recent years the discrepancies between the administrative net deficit and 
some of the adjusted indicators of the budget balance have significantly in creased (Seidel 1989). This 
results primarily from the growing amount of (investment) projects being financed off the budget, as 
well as the increasing proceeds from privatizations and the sharp cutbacks in the reserve position of 
various government agencies. We therefore extended our computations to the so called 
Finanzierungssa/do (see PSK 1991), an indicator that purges the revenue side of the administrative 
budget from most of the effects mentioned above. Additionally we include the outlays of the 
ASFINAG7 in government spending. 
The sample period ranges from 1962 to 1991. The significance of time series estimates. improves 
significantly with the length of the sample period. Thirty observations are a minimum rcq~1rcmcnt in 
this respect. It does, on the other hand, not seem advisable to extend the period of observation further 
5 For a more comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of using a central \'S. a general government 
concept in analyzing public sector developments see e.g. Chouraqui et.al. 1986. 
6 • . . . . · I · g the degree of perceptibility of,-arious A long lastmg d1scuss1on m pubhc finance theory aims at ana yzm . f 
taxes, fees and contributions. This discussion provides in fact important contributions ~o t~e e.~lanat1on o the 
t · ts (see e g the con1nbut1ons m Hanstme}'Cr long run development and composition of total govern men reccip · · · 
1983). But it hardly would justify a restriction of our research to taxes defined in a narrow sense. 
7 G ASFINAG is an agency that originally was founded to 
Autobahn- und Schnellstra.Benfinanzierungs A - - ·h"I •. h ·tended its agenda also 
plan and prefinance the construction of the interstate road network. Mcam, 1 e 11 as ex 
to railroad and building constructions. 
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back into the 1950's. Too many singular events during the years of reconstruction after world war II 
might lead to structural breaks and thus distort our estimates. 
4. The Methodology: Impulse response functions and error correction forms 
As already mentioned, we analyze causal dependencies by estimating impulse response functions. 
However, point estimates of impulse response functions contain no information about the statistical 
reliability of the effects detected. In our case this is especially true for the effects of shocks in the 
expenditure ratio on the revenue ratio and vice versa. We therefore implemented Monte Carlo 
simulations to asses whether the impulse responses are statistical significant at a 90% confidential 
level. 
VAR estimates also provide some insight into the properties of the relationships between the variables 
under investigation in the frequency domain. To analyse these properties we employed a somewhat 
modified version of a procedure originally proposed by Geweke, who defined linear feed back measures 
and their decomposition by frequency (Geweke 1982, 1984, 1986). Let, for illustrative purposes, 
A(L)x, = u, 
be an AR-process with the covariance matrix of u, Luu• being a diagonal matrix. The interpretation of 
the components of u, as primitive shocks requires further restrictions, for instance on A(O) which is in 
general not equal to the identity matrix (see Bernanke 1986). If A(J) is invertible at all frequencies Je 
[O,;r], the following MA-representation exists. 
x, = C(L)u, 
where 
] = A(Lr' 
The cross spectral density matrix of x is therefore: 
If we have a tri-variate system, the spectrum of the first variable x1 is 
where of is the variance of the u1, o; is the variance of the u2, c11 {J) represents c11 (e-a)c11 (e+a), and 
so on. The spectrum of x1 is therefore decomposed into three independent sources, originating from 
independent shocks in the three variables. To determine the influence of say u2 (innovations in x2) on x1 
one can define the causality spectrum 
7 
which represents the portion of the spectrum of x at frequencv ). tL-t c be ·b ed 
• 8 • • • • 1 J • 11.1 an attn ut to the shocks 
m r 2• The s1m1lanty of this measure with the coherence spectrum · ' ,-d, I h h 
. . . . . 1s e, 1 1:nt, a t oug onlv one 
d1rect1on of causaltty 1s taken mto account here In this sense the tenn 1·1 • . . . . · . causa I y spectrum scans 
Justified despite the fact that a causal mterpretat1on requires 1'dent1·r-., · t · 1· B thi . . . . . 1:wg rcs nc ions. ut ·s is 
essentially due to the 1mposs1b1ltty to determine the direction of ,·nstantaneo 1·1 b · · 9 11s causa I y v sbllstical means. • 
If A(2) is not invertible at 2=0 because of a unit-root in the vector x, problems in deriving S~.(.'-) ~ 
arise. Fortunately, this does not matter for the definition of S:r, • :r, ().), as the non-stationary parts of the 
AR-polynomial cancel. If the variables are 1(1) processes, the spectra of x and t\x differ bv the terms 
(l - e±U)"1 only. And these terms obviously cancels out, taking the ratio in the definition 0 ~ s., ... , ().) 
into account. 
If the innovations of the VAR are identified as primitive shocks by suitable restrictions, the cumulated 
historical effects of the different shocks on the variables under consideration ~ be examined. We 
undertake such an examination for the net deficit ratio in order to get a better understanding to ,,hat 
extent government expenditures, revenues and/or simply the gro,,th rate of nominal GDP, have 
determined the historical pattern of the deficit ratio. 
As the VAR-technique is essentially a reduced form method, it is highly susceptible to structural 
breaks. For this reason we employed Chow tests as indicators for such breaks. VAR estimates :ire :ilso 
of comparatively low precision in all those cases where only few observations are available. To tackle 
this problem one can try to give more structure to the model at hand, for instance by cstim.1ting an 
· error correction form. As we assume that the public sector meets its budget constraint, so th:it the net 
deficit ratio cannot rise indefinitely, the idea of an error correction formulation occurs :ilmost naturally 
(Bohn l 99 l ). High deficit ratios must induce the administration to lower expenditures and/or to raise 
revenues. Since an error correction model requires the variables to be non stationary and further 
imposes a cointegration restriction upon the VAR, a pre-testing procedure is neccss:iry to investigate 
the time series properties of the variables. The figures of government spending, tax revenues :ind the 
net deficit are expressed as GDP ratios. Among other reasons this proved useful to decrease their 
dependency on nominal income dynamics and to reduce their degree of integration. We employed the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron test (PHP) to investigate whether the four 
time series used in our model contain unit roots. The series are defined as: 
8 For the bi-variate case the definition of S (1) is equivalent to f:r • r (,l) in Gcwckc 1982, 
, X1 • X1 l I 
considering Pierces 1982 comment on this contribution. For the multivariate case, this is an ~xtension of 
Geweke 1982 which, compared to Geweke 1984, has the advantage that indirect caus.1lity ch:11ns arc also 
taken into account. 
9 There is an interesting connection between Sx1-u, (1) and common forecast error \'ariancc decomposition 
techniques for V ARs. The variance decomposition for t~ro is equal to 
l" Sr (..l) S (J.)-1 2-dJ., 0 X1• .... CT1 
which is a weighted average of s (J.}, given the spectrum ofx1 as the weighing function. 
X1 • X1 
BIPN 
AUSGNQ 
EINQ 
NDEFQ 
log of nominal GDP 
log of expenditure ratio = log of federal expenditures minus debt 
repayments minus BIPN 
log of revenue ratio = log of federal revenues minus BIPN 
net deficit ratio = A USGNQ - EINQ 
8 
Table l contains the test statistics. To allow for the proper alternative the test variant with time trend 
has been used whenever the variable indicated a significant trend component in a regression on a 
constant and a time variable. In all cases an autoregressive correction factor of l was sufficient to 
render the Ljung-Box Q-statistic insignificant at least at 10%. 
Table 1. Unit Root Tests 
Variable ADF PHP Probable order of 
Integration 
BIPN 0.635 -1.958 
--------·------·-· ····--···-----
MJJPN -2.409 -15.489 1(2) 
t:.2BJPN -6.147*** -36.821*"* 
AUSGNQ -2.383 -9.079 
MUSGNO -5.114••· -29.155**" 1(1) 
EINQ -1.173 -3.828 
···-·····-----·-- --
MINO -4.789*** -32.467*** 1(1) 
NDEFQ -3.137* -14.488 
llNDEFQ -4.713*** -28.850*"" 1(0) or l(l) 
ADF ... augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic, PHP ... Phillips-Perron test statistic 
• ... significant at 10% level, •• ... significant at 5% level, ••• ... significant at 1% level. 
Table I clearly indicates, that the expenditure ratio as well as the revenue ratio are likely to be 
integrated of degree one. According to both tests an 1(2) property for nominal GDP cannot be ruled 
out. The net deficit ratio seems to be a borderline case. The ADF-Test suggests NDEFQ to be trend 
stationary, whereas the PHP-test does not preclude an 1(1) property. The results of these unit root tests 
therefore suggest the following specification of a tri-variate error correction model. 
r 
!l
2
BJPN ] · 
MUSGNQ, = f(ll2BIPN,_;, MUSGNQ 1_;, MJNQt-j,NDEFQ,_1) 
MINQ, 
As already mentioned above, this model specification presumes that high deficit ratios induce the 
government to reduce expenditures or to raise revenues. Because of the supposed 1(2) property of 
nominal GDP, as well as simple plausibility considerations, it seems necessary to postulate that the 
expenditure and the revenue ratio are dependent on the growth rate, not on the absolute level, of 
nominal income. 
The critical point of this error correction form rests on the implicit assumption of a trend stationary net 
deficit ratio. This implies a cointegration between the expenditure and the revenue ratio. If this 
9 
assumption is not fulfilled, the a~ove_ model has to ~ estimated without imposing a cointegr.ition 
restriction. Such a free VAR esttmatton can be easily accomplished by including AUSGNQ (or 
EINQ,_1) as additional variable. •·• 
It is hardly possible to discriminate between a unit root or a root of say 0,99% by statistical rt\Qns. 
Model builder are therefore well prepared to express their personal views, at least sometimes, when 
specifying a model. But as soon as the estimations are carried out, it can be tested whether the 
postulated assumptions are compatible with the data, or not. In our case ,\·e can include A USGNQ as 
,., 
additional variable and test whether this variable has a significant effect on the estimation results. If 
this is not the case, the assumption of a trend stationary net deficit ratio is at least not in a sharp 
conflict with the data. 
Before the estimation procedures can be implemented, identification of the model has to be assured. If 
this is not the case, impulse responses and causality spectra can not be interpreted unambiguously. 
Following Bernake 1986 and Sims 1986 it is sufficient in this regard to impose restrictions upon the 
contemporaneous correlations of the VAR innovations. In line with their reasoning we specify the 
following innovation model. (Note that lower case letters now indicate innovations of the error 
correction form whereas upper case letters specify the variables themselves): 
[:,~:=:~] = [~ Q ~1 X [::] D.emq, p y I w, 
with cov(u,, v,) = cov(u,, w,) = cov(v,, w,) = 0 
This innovation model imposes three restrictions and is therefore just sufficient to identify the error 
correction model. These restrictions imply that innovations in the expenditure and in the revenue do not 
have any effect on the growth rate of nominal GDP within the same ~eriod. (The reverse_ is clearly 
possible). Furthermore, they assume that innovations in the revenue ratio do not have any direct effect 
on the expenditure ratio within the same period. 10 
Unfortunately one must be content with plausibility arguments when formulating such identifying 
restrictions; they are not testable (Cooley - LeRoy 1986). But since th~y imply, on the other hand, a 
recursive structure of the model, they are at the same time, very easy to implement. 
To estimate the above VAR model, it is necessary to specify the lag length. Since we chose the last 
· · · · · · · t d I tructure a lag length of three seems to be the thirty years as est1mat1on penod m a tn-vana e mo e s , . . . 
maximum. It turned out, however, that a Jag length of two was sufficient to render the Q-stat1st1cs and 
the OW-test statistic insignificant. 
10 d h' · licitly assumes that the direct - and per As far as the restrictions one and two are conccrne l is imp . ·l outweighed by multiplier 
definition negative - effects of changes in nomina! GDP on ~~e budg~i~:~~s, ~e ~~ird restriction ~n the other 
effects of fiscal policy measures, that would constitute a pos•t~ve re~ows ar:· redetermined by legislation. We 
hand seems justifiable because of the fact, that mo5t expend iture p es ha,·e 
3 
too direct and 
. . d I es in government re\'cnu therefore should not expect, that unant1c1patc c iang . d 1 . 1·n, ... rsion of this assumption . . B 'd \"e ascertaine t iat e,en an ~ automatic effect on current expenditures. es1 es • ' ' 
does not alter our estimation results significantly. 
10 
s. Empirical Results 
The key parameters of the estimated equations are reported in table 2. We included a dummy variable 
for the year 1975 in the equations, as the severe decline in the growth rate of nominal GDP and the rise 
in the expenditure ratio in 1975 cannot be explained endogenously by the model. The point estimates 
without a dummy are however very similar. The precision of the estimates, on the other hand, (with 
regard to the estimated standard errors) is markedly improved by the inclusion of the dummy. 
Table 2. Key-Parameters of the Estimated V AR Equations 
endogenous t-value of t-value of R2 prob. value t-value of 
variable NDEFO_, DM/5 of Q-stat. AUSGNO._, 
t:,.2BJPN -0.36 -3.74 ... 0.58 0.56 0.36 
MUSGNO. 1.46 -2.00·· 0.77 0.96 -1.37 
MINQ 3.63°0 • -0.61 0.71 0.46 -0.82 
• ... significant at 10% level, •• ... significant at 5% level, ••• ... significant at 1 % level 
The most important parameter of these equations is the I-value of NDEFQ,_1 since this variable 
represents the error correction term. As one can see this term is only significant in the revenue equation 
(even at a l % level). In the other two equations it is insignificant. The expenditure equation even shows 
the wrong sign for NDEFQ,_1• This clearly indicates, that it is almost exclusively the revenue ratio 
that has to carry the burden of adjustment to changes in the deficit ratio. This is also true for the 
estimations without a dummy. 
Alternatively we also estimated the model by including AUSGNQ,_1 as additional variable, so that the 
estimations are equivalent to a free VAR without a cointegration restriction. The last column of table 2 
exhibits the /-values of A USGNQ,_1 for all those equations. As A USGNQ,.1 is not significant in any of 
the equations we can assume that the cointegration restriction that has been used is not in sharp 
conflict with the data. 11 The results of the free V AR estimations are very similar to the one's reported, 
except for the estimated standard errors of the impulse responses which are slightly larger. 
The estimated impulse response .functions representing the dynamic properties of the various variables 
are reported in Fig. l together with their respective 90% confidence intervals which were obtained by 
Monte Carlo simulations.12 
The columns of figure l show the dynamic reaction of the system if shocked by unit innovations in one 
of the variables. The first column for instance indicates the response of the nominal growth rate (~ 
BIPN) on a unit shock in the growth rate itself (first row), a unit shock in the expenditure ratio (second 
row) or a unit shock in the revenue ratio (third row). The rows on the other hand illustrate the effects 
of unit shocks on the variables. The second row for instance displays the effects of a shock in the 
expenditure ratio to MIPN, A USGNQ, EINQ and NDEFQ. 
11 Strictly speaking, one should not use the I-value of A USGNQ,_1 for testing significance since A USGNQ is 
non stationary and not cointegrated with NDEFQ under Ha- The estimated coefficient follows therefore a so 
called non standard distribution. However the true 5% significance level is greater then two in any case, so 
that the argument in the text is even strengthened (for that argument see Pagan-Wickens 1989, p. 986 ft). 
12 We took 200 random draws of the estimated V AR coefficient according to their estimated posterior 
distribution and calculated the corresponding 200 impulse responses. 
The results are however remarkable in several respects. 
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1) Temporary shocks in the nominal growth rate of GDP have a permanent effect on the nominal 
growth rate of GDP itself, and on both, the expenditure and the revenue ratio. With the growth rate of 
GDP rising, both ratios decline. Although revenues and outlays increase with the growth of aggregate 
income initially, this increase is less than proportionate. However, the growth of expenditures and 
revenues adjusts to these higher growth rates of nominal GDP however gradually, so that a 
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stabilization of the corresponding ratios is attained at last, although at a lower level than at the outset. 
It is interesting to note that the speed of adjustment of the revenue ratio is significantly higher than that 
of the expenditure ratio. This indicates that tax revenues respond more quickly to GDP changes than 
expenditures. The fact that a higher nominal growth rate reduces the net deficit ratio can also be 
attributed to this delay. 
2) Shocks in the expenditure ratio have a strong and statistical significant effect on the expenditure and 
the revenue ratio. The delay in the reaction of the revenue ratio, mentioned above leads to an equivalent 
effect on the net deficit ratio. A positive expenditure shock considerably increases the net deficit ratio. 
This effect is only gradually reduced by an increased revenue ratio in later periods. 
3) There is no significant effect of shocks in the revenue ratio on both the nominal growth rate and the 
expenditure ratio, even in the short run. Positive shocks in the revenue ratio have only a short-lived 
influence on the revenue ratio. These shocks are therefore only temporarily effective. Permanent effects 
could not be detected. 
We thus can see that shocks in the nominal growth rate of GDP have permanent effects on the 
expenditure as well as on the revenue ratio. The same is true for shocks in the expenditure ratio. 
Shocks in the revenue ratio on the other hand do not have significant effects on the expenditure ratio 
and the effects on the revenue ratio are only temporary. This again indicates that expenditures 
dominate revenues. 
The results of the estimation of the causality spectra are reported in figure 2. Here the columns show 
the shares of the individual orthogonal shocks on the spectra of the variables, conditional on the 
frequency A, which ranges from O to tr, where ,r corresponds to a cycle of two years, td2 to a cycle of 
four years and O to an infinite cycle (trend component). 
The first column indicates that the variance of MJJPN is dominated nearly solely by own shocks 
(innovations in MIPN), along the whole frequency band. This raises serious doubts regarding the 
effectiveness of stabilization policies, that have so extensively been used in Austria during the last two 
decades. 
The second column decomposes the spectrum of the expenditure ratio. In the long run (l=O) 
innovations of MIPN account for approximately 50% of the total variation of AUSGNQ, whereas in 
the short run (A-=tr), nearly 100% of its variance can be attributed to own innovations. Shocks in the 
revenue ratio do not have any effect on the expenditure ratio along the whole frequency band. 
The third column decomposes the spectrum of EINQ. In the short run (l=,r) and also at some business 
cycle frequencies (l=td3), variations in the revenue ratio can largely be attributed to own innovations. 
At low frequencies, the importance of these own innovations is declining dramatically. In the long term, 
shocks in the nominal growth rate and in the expenditure ratio are the dominant source of fluctuations 
inEINQ. 
The fourth column displays the decomposition of the spectrum of the net deficit ratio NDEFQ. At low 
frequencies, shocks in MIPN, A USGNQ, and EINQ are of approximately equal importance, whereas 
at business cycle frequencies shocks in the revenue ratio predominate. Shocks in the nominal growth 
rate and shocks in the expenditure ratio apparently have offsetting effects on NDEFQ, especially at 
low frequencies, so that shocks in the revenue ratio are quite important for the development of the 
deficit in the long run. 
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Fig. 2. Causality Spectra 
Innovations in the revenue ratio thus turn out to be of practically no importance for the expenditure 
ratio. On the other hand, both shocks in the nominal growth rate and shocks in the expenditure ratio 
are the dominant source of fluctuations of the revenue ratio at low frequencies. At business cycle 
frequencies own innovations prevail. 
As mentioned in section 3, one can also use the estimated VAR model to calculate the accumulated 
effects of past innovations, if these innovation are identified by appropriate restrictions. We used this 
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I d ffi ts of past shocks on the net deficit. The results are reported 
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Fig. 3. Accumulated Effects of the Shocks on NDEFQ 
n,: (?1 r:irt of fisurc 3 illustrates the cumulated effects of shocks in the nominal growth rate on the 
r,:~,6:!;.:,t r:it,(). \\htch c;in be interpreted in some way as the built-in stabilizers of Austria's federal 
;:·.:~.:t In Im: '' 11h some earlier findings (Jaeger 1990), our estimations indicate that the effects of 
: ::·: J~:.,~i.,r,.: S!Jbiliurs arc significant. They were most marked during the extraordinary expansion 
,• .. ),!I:\ 11'" (,•n SI\{ d 
. l. ... .... ics an early seventies. The following period from 1975 to the end of the eighties 
\•l\ i: • .l•2,;:•rri•:d b. '(d 
~., , _. ·• •- · - ~ mi but overall negative effects of the automatic stabilizers on the deficit, 
..... i 1-r.'.-n "'"..Jhsts r 
i·~ __ · · ... ··· · 0 conclude that their relevance is commonly exaggerated (Lehner 1991). It 
: ~:-~\'(~,:~~::on thJt lhc automatic stabilizer effects indicate a tendency towards a deficit reduction 
T\:: \.:.:.:r<l r.1:1 of fi~rc 3 d. I . . 
(•,: ~.-• .1..r. •. , ,- 15P ays the cumulated effects of innovations in the expenditure ratio on 
., ~ ... ,, r-2::o • s thn GDP fli 
,.~,·r- -.,.'.···' L\ "· _ ·. • c ccts have already been filtered out they can be interpreted as being 
•·· '. '-· ,,.r::!1cnJrv Ii · • . ' 
.a .~.;- ;,: i:. •l. , · po. ttcal decisions regarding public spending plans. The data clearly detect 
.. ,_ r-,1,1t1cal attitude t th . . . . . . . 
! 1:,::-,! • ::,: ri·· 1 ,, • . s a e begmmng of the seventies. While 1nnovat1ons m the 
.. , • -.re cons1stcntlv · cd . . . . • • 
: - ---- • sign to reduce the deficit durmg the s1xt1es, they md1cate a 
l: •-: l::: :••·•::,_•~A 
T:. • • • -- ···--•-u tn lh.: effects f I · . . 
• t - · :· f:r 1975 ° 1 ic unan1tc1pated shock of 1975, the results were generated without 
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general tendency towards a deterioration of the budget balance since 1971. This tendency was 
interrupted only for two short-lived consolidation periods, the first one at the end of the seventies, the 
other one starting at the end of eighties. 
The third part of figure 3 shows the cumulated effects of innovations in the revenue ratio on the net 
deficit ratio. They are somewhat smaller than those of the expenditure ratio and more erratic. Our 
findings thus detect the increased tax burden resulting from the Paukenschlag (1968) and the 
introduction of the Luxussteuer (1979), both measures clearly designed to restore budget balance. Tax 
relief measures were comparatively less pronounced. Besides the tax component of the 
Wachstumsgesetze ( 1966) and some relief measures during the year before the 1986 election, the 
Grof3e Steuerreform of 1989 seems outstanding in this respect. 
As the error correction estimates implemented in this section are interpreted as a model of government 
behavior, we would expect them to be highly susceptible to structural breaks. To examine for such 
breaks, an extensive testing procedure was applied. Every equation was estimated for various sub-
periods. It then was tested whether the realizations of the endogenous variables for the remaining 
periods are compatible with the estimated equation. If they were not, they probably were generated by 
a different structure. The results of these Chow tests are reported in table 3. 
The first column of table 3 displays the year of a hypothetical structural break. The second column of 
table 3 shows the prob-values of the Chow tests for the first equation (l:l.2B!PN), the third column for 
the second equation and so on. In all cases the null hypothesis (no structural break) cannot be rejected 
at conventional significance levels,14 with the revenue ratio equation for the year 1990 (prob-value 
0, 123) being the only exception. This is probably due to the income tax reform 1989. 
Table 3. Chow Tests 
Year MUSGNO MINO 
- -
77 .777 .886 .867 
78 .831 .812 .786 
--··-----·--·--·-······-- ·····-· ---····· ······-·--·-·-·· ----------
----------· ---- ------------
89 .874 .734 .715 
80 .993 .850 .637 
-· 
--------- --·····-····--------.---------- ·-
81 .987 .772 .561 
82 .978 .655 .564 
------·-····-· --···--····--·--·-·--------- .. 
83 .964 .704 .754 
84 .950 .660 .698 
-- -------------------------
----
85 .934 .697 .602 
86 .880 .638 .476 
---------· 
87 .780 .492 .433 
88 .701 .890 .332 
··- ------···--- . 
. 
89 . 534 .969 .232 
90 .809 .887 .123 
------- .. --···-----·····------··-··--------· 
91 .953 .775 .418 
To investigate the dependence of our results on the estimation period even further, we also reestimated 
the error correction model for the sub-periods 62 to 81 and 72 to 91. It again turned out that the 
estimated impulse responses as well as the causality spectra did not change in any significant way. 
14 We also carried out CUSUM and CUSUM2 tests. These tests, too, did not indicate any structural breaks. 
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Only the estimated standard errors of the impulse response were slightly larger. But this is what one 
would expect when the estimation period is shortened_ Is 
To analyze the consequences of the imposed cointegration restriction we also estimated the model as 
"free" V AR by including A USGNQ,_1 as additional variable. As already mentioned in section 3, this 
had no significant consequences on the point estimates of the impulse responses and the causality 
spectra. 
At last we examined to what extent the use of an alternative budget concept would alter our results. As 
already mentioned, we made use of the Finanzierungssaldo des Bundes extended by the ASFINAG. 
We thus took account of the most important wealth-transactions and off-budget outlays to generate a 
deficit concept often considered as an economically superior indicator of government's long run budget 
constraint. One could expect, therefore, that the government would base its fiscal decisions on such 
corrected data rather than on the administrative budget concept. A reestimation of our model using the 
Finanzierungssaldo follows quite naturally. 
It comes as surprise that the resulting point estimates do not differ significantly from those using the 
administrative budget concept as reported earlier. However, the Chow tests indicate a significant 
structural break in the revenue ratio, becoming effective in 1987/88. It is since then, that differences 
between the two concepts have become increasingly pronounced. For these two years the null 
hypotheses could be rejected at a significance level of 5,8 % resp. 6,4 %. This is in any case a strong 
indicator that the government does not base its budgetary decisions on data generated by this concept, 
but rather on the administrative figures. This might be due to the fact that the administrative concept 
dominates the discussion of fiscal policy in the media and the public nearly exclusively. But as any 
changes of the adjusted budget figures become effective for the administrative budget data too, 
although with some delay, this indicates that policy decision making processes are clearly short run 
oriented. · 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Our contribution was aiming to improve the understanding of the relationship between government 
spending and taxing decisions in Austria. Unfortunately, public choice theory does not provide a 
framework that would allow us to discriminate between the rivalling spend and tax and tax and spend 
hypotheses definitely. The relations between the budget aggregates had therefore to be investigated 
empirically. 
We estimated a tri-variate VAR model including aggregate income as additional exploratory variable, 
implementing impulse-response functions and frequency domain techniques in order to identify the 
causal relation between government outlays and receipt. For that purpose we used time series of 
different (official and adjusted} budgetary concepts. Since we interpreted the budget making process as 
an error correction model we were allowed to estimate whether revenues or expenditures have to 
shoulder the burden of adjustment whenever the federal government sees its long run budget constraint 
hurt. 
Our empirical estimations clearly indicate that the two propositions stated at the beginning of this 
paper, which clearly are in favor of the tax and spend hypotheses, can hardly claim any validity in the 
case of Austria. The development of the federal budget was driven dominantly by spending decisions 
IS The results of these estimations are available upon request. 
not by the dynamics of government revenues. The traditiorul \\id .. ·sprt::id , ie'., dut 5"""".t·~~ ., ... 
... "" .., .... ,,.. ••. ti U:'\:1~LY:S 
would cause taxes rather than the other way round seems strongly confimi::d 
Although the political economic explanations for an inverse causal11y running from u.,c-s to 
government outlays seem to be increasingly popular, we could not find any support for them Ul the 
data. Since one explanation for this proposition argues ,,ith the effects of an increasing intenuhoml 
integration of national economic policies, we cannot exclude that it will considerable gain rekv~c L'l 
the future, as this integration process will - without doubt - become more important in the future 
Historically it seems that the more traditional approach, viewing budget deficits as being dominated b) 
outlays, is more in line with our observations. This does not mean, that :iny attempts 10 reduce budgct 
deficits through revenue restraints are automatically condemned to failure. But \\~ can definitely 
maintain that the budgetary developments of the past were not characterized by an e:xcess of re\ cnues, 
which induced political decision makers to search for ever new activitie$. It was rather the other way 
round, with governments facing new and costly obligations that had to be financed by additional 
revenues. As a consequence, if governments want to restrict activities and to reduce budget deficits by 
revenue constraints, this clearly entails a fundamental change in political attitudes Whether tlus 1s 
under way remains to be seen. 
18 
References 
Barro R. 1979: On the Determination of the Public Debt; Journal of Political Economy 87, 940-971. 
Bernake B. 1986: Alternative Explanations of the Money-Income Correlation, Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy, 25, 1986, 49-100. 
BMfF 1985: Aufgaben und Ziele einer neuen Finanzpolitik - Grenzen staatlicher Verschuldung, Bonn. 
Bohn H.1991: Budget Balance through Revenue or Spending Adjustments? Some Historical Evidence for the 
United States; Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 333-359. 
Bos D, Genser B, Holzmann R.1983: Die Entwicklung des Finanzausgleichs in ausgewahlten Bundesstaaten: 
Osterreich; Handbuch der Finanzwissenschaft, 3. Aun., Tiibingen: 123-162. 
Buchanan J.M., Wagner R.E. 1977: Democracy in Deficit; New York. 
Buiter W.H.1983: Measurement of the Public Sector Deficit and its Implications for Policy Evaluation and 
Design; IMF Staff Papers 30, 306-349. 
Buiter W.H. 1985: A Guide to Public Sector Debt and Deficits; Economic Policy 1, 
13-61. 
Bundesregierung 1987: Sanieren und Erneuern - Das Arbeitsprogramm der Bundesregierung, Wien. 
Bundesregierung 1990: Durch Reformschwung Ostcrreichs Chancen nutzen - Das Arbeitsiibereinkommen der 
Bundesregierung, Wien. 
Chouraqui J.C. et al, 1986: Public Debt in a Medium Term Perspective; OECD • Economic Studies 7, 103 • 
153. 
Cooley T.F., Le Roy St.F., 1985: Atheoretical Macroeconometrics, A Critique, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 16, 1985, 283-308. 
De Grauwe P. 1989: Disinflation in the EMS and in the Non-EMS Countries: What have we learned? 
Empirica 16, 161-176. 
Ditz J. 1992: Neuorientierung in der Budgetpolitik; Wirtschafispolitische Blatter 39, 176-183. 
Genser B. 1986: Steuerprogression: Konzepte und quantitative Ergebnisse fiir Osterreich, in: Weigel W. et.al. 
(Hsg) 1986; Handbuch der Osterreichischen Finanzpolitik, Wien, 287 -302. 
Geweke J. 1982: The Measurement of Linear Dependence and Feedback between Multiple Time Series, 
Journal of American Statistical Association, 77, 1982, 304-324. 
Geweke J. 1984: Measure of Conditional Linear Dependence and Feedback between Time Series, Journal of 
American Statistical Association, 79, 1984, 907-915. 
Geweke J. 1986: The Supcrneutrality of Money in the United States: An Interpretation of the Evidence, 
Econometrica, 54, 1986, 1-21. 
19 
Government Printing Office 1984: Economic Report of the President \\' 1 - 0 C . as 11ngton ... 
Government Printing Office 1985: Economic Report of the President, Washington O C. 
Hansemeyer (Hsg) 1983: Staatsfinanzierung im Wandel, Berlin. 
Heller W.W. 1967: New Dimensions of Political Economy, New York. 
HMSO 1986: Financial Statement and Budget Report; Her Majesties Stationery Office, London 
Jaeger A. 1990: The Measurement and Interpretation of Structural Budget Balances; Empiri~ 17, 155•169_ 
KotlikofIL.J. 1984: Economic Impact of Deficit Financing; IMF - Starr Papers 31, 
594-582. 
Lacina F. 1992: Die Strategic der Budgetkonsolidiemng; Wirtscha0spolitische 81:ltter 39. u,,-176 
Lehner G. 1991: Der Zeitfaktor im Bundesbudget, in: Gantner M. (Hsg) 1991: Handbuch des orrcntlichcn 
Haushaltswesens, Wien, 197-31 l. 
Lehner G. 1992: Budgetkonsolidiemng: eine mittclfristige Analyse, WIFO-Monatshcfic, 65, I 24-1 )J 
McKee M.J., Visser Sounders J.C. 1986: Marginal Tax Rates on the Use of L1bour and Capital in OECD-
Countrics; OECD Economic Studies 7, 46-101. 
Miller S., Russek F. 1990: Co-integration and Error-Correction Models: The Temporal Cau~1li1y bch,ecn 
Government Taxes and Spending, Southern Economic Journal 57, 221-229. 
Musgrave R.A. 1985: A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine; in: Auerbach A.J .. Feldstein M (Ed~) l'JR.'i: 
Handbook of public Economics, Amsterdam, 1-59. 
OECD 1981: Economic Survey United Kingdom, Paris. 
Pagen A.R.,Wickens M.R. 1989: A Survey of Some Recent Econometric Methods, The Economic Journal. 99, 
1989, 903-1025. 
Pierce P.A. 1982: Comment on Geweke 1982, Journal of American Statistical Association, 77. 1982.315-316. 
PSK 1991: Bericht der Osterrcichischen Postsparkasse iiber die Finanzschuld des Bundcs. Wien 
Rowley Ch.K. 1987: Classical Political Economy and the Debt Issue; in: Buchanan J.M. cul (Eds.) 19S7: 
Deficits; Oxford, 49-74. 
Sachverstiindigenrat 1985: Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschafilichen Entwicklung. Bonn. 
Seidel H. 1989: Budgetkonsolidierung als Daueraufgabe; Wlrtschaflspolitische Blatter 36, 3GS-JSO. 
Sims A.Ch. 1986: Are Forecasting Models Usable for Policy Analysis. Federal Reserve Bank of ~1inncapolis 
Quarterly Review, Winter 86, 2-16. 
Smith A. 1776: An Inquiry into the Nature and Course of the Wealth of Nations. 
20 
Streissler E. 1989: The International Consequences of Less Progressive Taxation; in: Bos D, Felderer B. (Hsg) 
1989: The Political Economy of Progressive Taxation, Berlin, 43-70. 
von Furstenberg G.M. et.al. 1986: Tax and Spend or Spend and tax?; The Review of Economics and Statistics 
68, 179-188. 
Bisher sind in dieser Reihe erschienen: 
Eigl R., Experimentielle Methoden in der Mikrookonomik, No. 1, Mai 1991 
Dockner E., Long N.V., International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Non-Cooperative 
Strategies, No. 2, September 1991 
Andraea C.A., Eigl R., Der offentliche Sektor aus ordnungspolitischer Sicht, No. 3, Oktober 
1991 
Dockner E., A Dynamic Theory of Conjectural Variations, No. 4, Oktober 1991 
Feichtinger G., Dockner E., Cyclical Consumption Pattern and Rational Addictions, No. 5, 
Oktober 1991 
Marterbauer M., Die Rolle der Fiskalpolitik im Schwedischen Wohlfahrtsstaat, No. 6, Dezember 
1991 
Pichler E., Cost-Sharing of General and Specific Training with Depreciation of Human Capital, No. 7, 
Dezember 1991 
Pichler E., Union Wage Bargaining and Status, No. 8, Dezember 1991 
Pichler E., Costs of Negotiations and the Structure of Bargaining - a Note, No. 9, Dezember 
1991 
Nowotny E., The Austrian Social Partnership and Democracy, No. 10, Dezember 1991 
Pichler E., Walther H., The Economics of Sabbath, No. 11, April 1992 
Klatzer E., Unger B., Will Internationalization Lead to a Convergence of National Economic 
Policies?, No. 12, June 1992 
Bellak C., Towards a Flexible Concept of Competitiveness, No. 13, May 1992 
